Hallandale Beach



An Analysis of the City of Hallandale Beach Automated For-Profit Red Light Camera Program

By Paul Henry August 18, 2012

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A. Executive summary

Despite a reduction in red light running crashes at the one intersection, this analysis has shown that the use of automated for-profit law enforcement devices has not increased the safety for the motoring public in the City of Hallandale Beach, Florida. To the contrary, from a safety perspective, the number of crashes for both intersections where it has been placed in use have increased, with significant increases at one intersection. There were no fatal crashes. A review of extended data for one intersection showed the same red light running crash reduction from 2008-2009 with no device use.

An August 2010 news story¹ reported that 94% of all tickets issued in Hallandale Beach at the first intersection (since December 2009) were for right-turn violations, which by their nature do not cause the serious injury or fatal crashes that straight-through violations do. When the new 2010 state law was followed, violations declined 77% in the course of two (2) months.

For this analysis, an additional aspect was reviewed, that of the cost to the taxpayer. It was determined the city paid on average \$11,118 per month in 2011 to the for-profit vendor, American Traffic Solutions². Using a mathematical formula with the known information, a baseline cost per month was established, with a corresponding number for ticket revenue needed to exceed this amount. For 2011, the tickets per month needed were 213. The average was found to be 183, which resulted in taxpayer money being expended to operate the automated system. For 2012, the monthly average cost has increased by over \$3,000, so the monthly number of tickets will likewise need to increase. Based on 2012 police violation data through April, the number of tickets has increased each month, but not to a point where the device costs are being met when averaged.

Additionally, police violation data² shows there has been no consistent reduction in alleged violations in 2011, and in 2012 through April, there has been an increase each month. This indicates the automated devices are failing to perform their desired function of violation reduction. The Mayor of Hallandale Beach reported grossly inaccurate and baseless violation data in a July 2012 letter to the editor³ of a local newspaper.

Based on this information, automated for-profit law enforcement at these intersections can be said to have had a positive to no effect on red light running crashes (four (4) total; one DUI causation) and a negative effect on other crashes, notably the total number of crashes and rear end crashes. Additionally, the revenue aspect of them has been shown to be far less than what other cities are reporting and Hallandale Beach appears to be operating at a loss for 2011 and so far in 2012.

In summary, there is no safety benefit to the citizens, and there is no financial benefit to the taxpayer due to automated for-profit law enforcement. To the contrary, there appears to be a recurring burden to the taxpayer each month.

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B. Predication

1. Purpose of automated for-profit law enforcement devices

It is noted that proponents of automated for-profit law enforcement devices (commonly known as red light cameras) state without exception their sole purpose is safety. Safety therefore is best defined as not having a traffic crash due to red light running. Safety is not defined as having an increase in injury crashes or other types of crashes regardless of those caused by red light running.

2. Purpose of this analysis

a. Crash data

The purpose of this analysis is to utilize Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) traffic crash data for the City of Hallandale Beach intersections that received an automated for-profit law enforcement device to determine the actual need based upon a July 22, 2012 editorial written by the Mayor³.

b. Revenue

Proponents and for-profit company representatives of automated for-profit devices frequently list one of their benefits as being at no cost to the taxpayer. This analysis will include the known data pulled from the City of Hallandale Beach records² as to the true revenue aspect. This information will be applied to the above editorial and analyzed for a total cost to the taxpayer.

C. Analysis: History, format, data, locations, time frames, legal issues, compensation, and benchmarks

1. History

Hallandale Beach's automated for-profit red light program was in place and working at the US 1 and Hallandale Beach Bv. intersection as of December 2009 and tickets were issued starting at that same time. An additional device was added to the Hallandale Beach Bv. and SW 10th Ter. Intersection beginning in March 2011.

2. Format

The format of this analysis will be to compare traffic crashes for equal periods before and after the use of automated for-profit devices using the benchmarks as noted herein. The financial analysis will review the cost paid by the city in the form of monthly checks to the vendor and contrasted with the tickets claimed by the Mayor and then the actual number from police data reports².

3. Data received

The crash data was received from the DOT on August 6, 2012 and is only inclusive of data through December 31, 2011 due to DOT limitations. The city violation and expense report data² was downloaded on August 18, 2012.

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a. The DOT data lists the number of people injured or killed. For the purposes of this analysis, any injury or fatality amount is classified as one crash. If both an injury and a fatality are shown, the crash will be classified as a fatal crash. DOT data was not available beyond December 31, 2011, and it is noted this data is not as accurate as actual crash reports. However, the cost of actual crash reports (\$16 each) is beyond the budget of the author, who is not funded by anyone. This analysis uses the best data available.

b. The date ranges have been broken down into as equal an interval as possible two years prior and two (2) years after device use for intersection 1 and ten (10) months for intersection 2 so as to make an equitable analysis. DOT nodes were added for accurate crash data location. Based on the above, the periods for this analysis will be as follows:

Table 1: Intersection numbering, DOT Node, in-service date, and date range

Number	Location	DOT Node	Date in service	Data range
1	US 1 N / E. Hallandale	01054	December 5,	December 5, 2007
	Beach Bv.		2009	through December
				4, 2011
2	Hallandale Beach Bv. / SW	02789	March 1, 2011	May 1, 2010
	10 Ter.			through December
				31, 2011

4. Locations and periods

A public record request was sent to the City of Hallandale Beach on July 24, 2012 requesting the dates and locations of automated for-profit device use. On August 3, 2012, a reply was received from the city entitled "Completed Sites Report" with an address in Scottsdale, Arizona (American Traffic Solutions, or ATS, a for-profit vendor of the automated devices). The reply indicated the following:

NB US 1 N (Federal Hwy.) / E. Hallandale Beach Bv., 1st citation 12/05/2009 WB Hallandale Beach Bv. / SW 10 St., 1st NOV 03/01/2011 SB US 1 N (Federal Hwy.) / E. Hallandale Beach Bv., 1st NOV 06/01/2011

It is noted:

- a. Hallandale Beach Bv. is also SR 858. Upon referencing the DOT intersection listings and verifying it upon a map, this road does not intersect with SW 10th St. It intersects with both SW 10th Av. and SW 10th Ter. A July 12, 2011 news story⁴ was located that showed the location as SW 10th Ter.
- b. The acronym NOV is "Notice of Violation" which is the term used for the ticket a vehicle owner receives in the mail.
- c. The first and third locations are the same intersection, and as such will be analyzed as one intersection, herein referred to as intersection 1. SR 858 and SW 10^{th} Ter. will be referred to as intersection 2.

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5. Legal issues

Media research determined the City of Hallandale Beach had been the subject of a lawsuit and agreed to a settlement to partially refund fines that had been paid⁵ due to their use of automated for-profit devices prior to them being authorized by state law. The story indicates the cutoff date was July 1, 2010, which was the effective date of the devices being authorized under Florida law. Accordingly, that date will be used for the device that was in use prior to the legal authorization. This analysis will not otherwise deal with the numerous legal issues involved with the use of automated for-profit law enforcement.

6. Compensation and backing

The author was not paid to prepare this analysis or assisted by any other person or organization other than peer review of the finished product for typographical errors.

7. Benchmarks

Using the aforementioned safety definitions, the benchmarks utilized to arrive at a conclusion for the effectiveness of automated enforcement are as follows:

- Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase?
- Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase?
- Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease?
- Did crashes caused by red light running involve an impaired driver?
- Did rear end crashes increase or decrease?
- Did other crashes increase or decrease?

An overall synopsis will follow the intersection data.

D. How to use this report

For the cycle preceding automated device use date ranges, pre-automated device data will be compared with the same amount of time after automated device use. If there was an increase in the data, it will be shown in red with a percentage listed. If there was a decrease, it will be shown in blue with a percentage listed. If there is no change, no color-coding will be used. Red data does not favor automated for-profit law enforcement devices, while blue data does. A graphical section follows the individual intersection analysis for an easier view of the data.

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E. Intersection with automated devices: Specific data

1. US 1 N (Federal Hwy.) / E. Hallandale Beach Bv.: 145 Total Crashes

a. Pre-automated device: December 5, 2007 through December 4, 2009: 24 months

Total crashes: 59

Total injury crashes: 19

Crashes caused by red light running: 4 (Note: 1 DUI/drugs)

Rear end crashes: 28 Other crashes: 31

b. During automated device use: December 5, 2009 through December 4, 2011: 24 months

Total crashes: 86

Total injury crashes: 19

Crashes caused by red light running: 0

Rear end crashes: 42 Other crashes: 44

- Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Increase of 46%
- Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? No change
- Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? Decrease of 100%
- For crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? 1 (25%)
- Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 50%
- Did other crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 41%

Conclusion- For this intersection, there was a marked decrease in red light running crashes, and none have taken place since use of the devices. There are however an inordinate amount of crashes with "other" coding for the cause during both periods, 33% for each one. These crashes could have significantly affected the data. This positive outcome is offset by the increase in all (46%) as well as rear end (50%) and other (41%) crashes. The totality of the circumstances indicates the 27 added crashes outweigh the three (3) caused by non-impaired red light running.

Extended data back to January 2007 showed there was one (1) additional red light running crash at this intersection.

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2. Hallandale Beach Bv. / SW 10th Ter.: 36 Total Crashes

a. Pre-automated device: May 1, 2010 through February 28, 2011: 10 months

Total crashes: 17 Total injury crashes: 6

Crashes caused by red light running: 0

Rear end crashes: 10 Other crashes: 7

b. During automated device use: March 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011: 10 months

Total crashes: 19 Total injury crashes: 6

Crashes caused by red light running: 0

Rear end crashes: 10 Other crashes: 9

• Did the overall number of crashes decrease or increase? Increase of 11%

- Did the number of injury crashes decrease or increase? No change
- Did crashes caused by red light running increase or decrease? No change
- For crashes caused by red light running, did they involve an impaired driver? NA
- Did rear end crashes increase or decrease? No change
- Did other crashes increase or decrease? Increase of 28%

Conclusion- For this intersection, there was no change in red light running crashes due to there being none for either period. As with the prior intersection, there are however an inordinate amount of crashes with "other" coding for the cause during both periods, between 17 and 26% for each one. These crashes could have significantly affected the data. Unlike the prior intersection, there is no positive outcome after the use of automated devices began. There is only a negative outcome due to the increase in all (11%) and other (28%) crashes. The totality of the circumstances indicates there was no benefit reaped by automated enforcement.

Since data for 2007 through 2011 was available and this intersection has only utilized automated devices for a very short period, all red light running crashes were analyzed. It was determined prior to the above analysis period, five (5) red light running crashes had taken place:

2007: 1 (no automated enforcement in place) 2008: 4 (no automated enforcement in place) 2009: 0 (no automated enforcement in place) 2010: 0 (no automated enforcement in place)

This data shows how random this type of crash is, and how automated enforcement devices have no effect on it.

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F. Financial analysis

Proponents of automated for-profit enforcement devices often cite the factor of no cost to the taxpayer for the devices. That aspect was also reviewed.

1. City data

The City of Hallandale Beach publishes online a monthly report². As a part of this monthly report, expenses are listed by date, check number, vendor number, vendor name, and amount. Also listed are the number and type of tickets issued due to automated for-profit enforcement. It is noted that for the "Red light camera monthly report" the only figures are violations and revenue; no crash data is listed.

a. Expenses

A review of the expenses paid to the for-profit device vendor American Traffic Solutions returned the following:

Table 2: 2011 Monthly payments to ATS by the City of Hallandale Beach **2011**

Date	Amount
January 2011	5,447
February 2011	5,003
March 2011	4,762
April 2011	10,092
May 2011	9,834
June 2011	0
July 2011	10,036
August 2011	0
September 2011	29,402
October 2011 (2 payments)	29,597
November 2011	14,742
December 2011	14,506
Total for 2011	\$133,421
Average cost/month	\$11,118

Table 3: 2012 Monthly payments to ATS by the City of Hallandale Beach **2012**

Date	Amount
January 2012	14,618
February 2012	14,654
March 2012 (no data)	0
April 2012	14,778
May 2012	14,478
4-month total for 2012	\$58,528
Average cost/month	\$14,632

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b. Tickets from automated for-profit devices

A review of the reported violations revealed the following information:

Table 4, 2011 automated device violations as reported by the police department

Month	Total	Straight	Left	Right
January 2011	72	23	0	49
February 2011	40	11	0	29
March 2011	299	226	0	73
April 2011	158	143	0	15
May 2011	310	296	0	14
June 2011	87	86	0	1
July 2011	296	283	11	2
August 2011	237	215	10	12
September 2011	272	251	7	14
October 2011	114	110	0	4
November 2011	163	139	6	18
December 2011	148	125	11	12
Totals for 2011	2196	1908	45	243
Monthly avg.	183	159	4	20

Table 5, 2012 automated device violations as reported by the police department

Month	Total	Straight	Left	Right
January 2012	172	151	8	13
February 2012	220	177	12	31
March 2012	238	203	19	16
April 2012	345	290	12	43
Totals	975	821	51	103
4-month average	244	205	13	26

In August 2010, a news story¹ reported 94% of all violations in Hallandale Beach were for right turn violations, and that due to the law changing in 2010 (allowing for slow-rolling right turns in a "careful and prudent manner"), there was a 77% decline in violations due to this factor alone.

c. Editorial by the Mayor- number of violations

The Mayor stated the following in a July 22, 2012 edittorial³:

The number of red-light running violations at our first camera location at Federal Highway and East Hallandale Beach Boulevard has fallen dramatically since state law changed in June 2010. That month, there was a high of 675 violations, which has since plummeted steadily to 58 in January 2012. Our other locations show that work remains to be done. Violations at West Hallandale Beach Boulevard and Southwest 10th Terrace began at 219 per month in March 2011, rose to a high of 331 in May of that year, and dropped back 218 in January of this year.

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At South Federal Highway and East Hallandale Beach Boulevard, violations started out at 24 in June 2011 and rose to 45 in January.

d. Revenue- gross vs. net

Under Florida Statute 316.0083, a city receives \$75 gross revenue for each paid ticket. It is noted not all tickets are ever paid, as some defendants are acquitted or others fail to pay them. Using a payment rate of 95%, the following shows the cost to the taxpayer based on the numbers claimed by the Mayor as well as the actual police department numbers:

Table 6, net gain or loss

Number of	Gross	Device	Employee (1)	Net gain or (loss)
tickets/month @	revenue/	average	cost/month*	
\$75 (95% rate)	month	cost/month in		
		2011		
58 (55)	4,125	11,118	4,865	(11,858)
331 (314)	23,550	11,118	4,865	7,567
218 (207)	15,525	11,118	4,865	(458)
45 (43)	3,225	11,118	4,865	(12,758)
2011: 183 (174)	13,050	11,118	4,865	(2,933)
2012: 244 (232)	17,400	14,632	4,865	(2,097)
2011 Annualized:				
95% of 2196 (2086)	156,450/yr	133,421/yr	58,390/yr	(35,361)/12 = \$(2,947)

^{*}Florida law requires a trained officer to review violations. The starting salary for a Hallandale Beach Police Officer as of August 2012 was \$48,658, with 20% added here due to taxes and retirement to reflect a more accurate cost to the taxpayer. This figure does not take into account any overtime or other costs due to court, etc.

Table 7, known actual costs for 2011, best-case scenario

Number of	Gross revenue at	Payouts to ATS	Officer cost	Net gain or
tickets	\$75 each			(loss)
2,196	\$164,700	\$133,421	\$48,658	(\$17,379)

Table 8, projected actual costs for 2012, best-case scenario

Number of	Gross revenue at	Payouts to ATS	Officer cost	Net gain or
tickets	\$75 each			(loss)
2,928	\$219,600	\$175,584	\$48,658	(\$4,642)

1. Revenue loss

Based on this data, the threshold number of violations per month for the city to break even on automated for-profit enforcement is 213. Based upon the Mayor's claimed numbers³, the city has fallen short of this number repeatedly. Based upon the actual police department numbers, the city was well below this threshold with 183 per month for 2011. This average number shows the city lost about \$2,933/month for all of 2011, and the city will continue to lose over \$2,000/month based on 2012 numbers that are available.

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2. Revenue recovery

The 2011 payments to ATS are indicative of a "cost neutral" system vs. a fixed contract amount. In this situation, as the amount varies each month vs. a fixed contract amount. This situation arises when a city has insufficient tickets to meet the minimum contract amount. The amount due is deferred until later, when presumably there will be sufficient ticket revenue.

3. Cost neutral

Florida Statute 316.0083 prohibits a per-ticket payment scheme. The approved method is a monthly contract, which is usually anywhere from \$3,000 to \$5,000 per device per month. An automated for-profit vendor in California, Redflex, attempted to utilize a cost neutral system and a lawsuit was filed⁶. Presiding Judge Diane M. Price of the California Superior Court wrote:

"This court agrees with the defendant that the Redflex contract's cost neutrality provision improperly bases the city's payment to Redflex on the number of citations generated, at least to the extent there are not enough citations generated to cover the fee in a given month. Even if one were to interpret the contract's provision obligating the city to pay 'the cumulative balance invoiced' to mean that any outstanding balance unpaid in a given month due to a deficit of citations will be rolled over to invoices for subsequent months, that cumulative balance obligation is still limited 'to the extent of gross cash received by the city' and, therefore, may never have to be paid if insufficient citations are issued."

4. Discrepancy with Mayor's editorial


It is noteworthy the Mayor's claimed violation numbers³ for January 2012 totaled 321 (58+218+45 above). The true number from the police department was 172². The figure of 321 was an 87% increase above the true number. The possibility the Mayor was referencing another month or year was examined. The number 321 was not eclipsed in 2012 until April, when 345 violations were reported. In 2012, police data² shows there were 220 in February and 238 in March. There had been only 148 in December 2011. There were not exactly 321 violations reported² by the police department in all of 2011 or 2012.

Aside from the financial issue, the fact the alleged violations are still as high as they are demonstrates the devices are ineffective.

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
G. Graphical data

1. US 1 N (Federal Hwy.) / E. Hallandale Beach Bv.: 145 Total Crashes December 5, 2009- December 4, 2011




Automated for-profit enforcement was in use from December 5, 2009 on.

2. Hallandale Beach Bv. / SW $10^{\rm th}$ Ter.: 36 Total Crashes May 1, 2010- December 31, 2011



Automated for-profit enforcement was in use from March 1, 2011 on.

3. Average red light running crashes per year, 2007-2011 (5 years)



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H. Conclusions and overall synopsis

Overall, there are three (3) significant conclusions based upon this analysis.

1. Use of automated for-profit law enforcement did not enhance traffic safety.

For the time prior to the use of automated for-profit enforcement devices, the only possible benefit was a reduction of red light running crashes at intersection 1. This benefit comes at the cost of an increase in overall crashes as well as other types of crashes. As was noted for the extended historical data for intersection 2, a similar reduction in red light running crashes was seen from 2008-2009 with no use of automated devices. Additionally, of the four (4) red light running crashes at intersection 1, one (1) was due to a DUI.

Of significance, the total amount crashes and the amount of rear end crashes at intersection 1 has been a safety factor. Prior to device use, there were 59 total crashes and 28 rear end crashes at this intersection. Post device use, there were 86 total and 42 rear end crashes.

Finally from a safety aspect, when the city was compelled to comply with the 2010 law authorizing automated for-profit devices, their violation rate decreased sharply due to not issuing notices on less hazardous right turn violations. This reduction was reported¹ as 77% over the course of two (2) months. This also negatively affected the revenue aspect.

2. The use of automated for-profit law enforcement devices has cost, not saved, the taxpayer money

Proponents of and salespeople for automated for-profit devices argue that there is no cost to the taxpayer to utilize them. In this example, it has been proven via data from the City of Hallandale Beach that \$133,421 was paid to the automated device vendor ATS, and the \$48,658 annual salary of an entry-level police officer added. It has likewise been proven that in all of 2011, the city recorded 2,196 violations involving these devices, down significantly from prior years when all right turn violations were included. In the best-case scenario of every violation being paid and the actual salary being the only amount the city had to pay, this would have resulted in a loss to the taxpayer of \$17,379 for 2011, or an average of \$1,448 per month. Since in reality every violation is not prosecuted or paid, police officers receive raises and employees have additional costs such as IRS withholding and retirement, the revenue side is lower and the expense side is higher. Using a conservative 95% payment rate for the violations and 20% for the employee costs, this would result in a monthly loss (cost to the taxpayer) of approximately \$2,947.

3. A public official stated grossly inaccurate statistics or data publicly

In a July 22, 2012 letter to the editor by the Mayor of Hallandale Beach in July 2012³, the Mayor claimed violation numbers that have been proven to be grossly inaccurate. Her number of 321 violations in January 2012 was proven to be 172. All months for 2011 and 2012 were reviewed, and the number 321 did not appear for any of them. This gross exaggeration of the violation numbers would have the effect of the readers believing the violations were much higher than they actually were.

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Overall synopsis

In the author's law enforcement experience, rear end crashes are caused by driver inattention, and are non-preventable. Additionally, it is impossible to predict where or when a traffic crash will take place. The data revealed in this report could be drastically different one way or the other if reviewed again in another year based on just a few crashes. This is again reinforced in the extended data.

It is inconsistent with the goal of safety and fiscal sensibility to utilize enforcement, either human or automated, where there have been very few or not been any crashes or any preventable crashes.

It is noted crash data is readily available to the local police, who are the ones that prepare the crash reports utilized and would therefore be the first ones to know where the crashes are taking place, what is causing them, and then assigning staffing for enforcement in order to reduce the crash rate.

Regardless of the law enforcement problem, the above situation is a sound law enforcement management technique. For example, a city may be experiencing daytime burglaries in a certain neighborhood. The Chief of Police would be wise to direct additional patrol staffing to that area until the problem subsided. Another example is as evidenced by Chapter 17 Section 20 of the law enforcement-accredited *Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual*⁷. The manual directs the Troop Commander to assess crash data quarterly, prepare an analysis, and forward it down the chain of command in order to reduce the crash rate.

The analysis process is specified in Chapter 17 Section 20.06:

17.20.06 PROCEDURES

A. ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC CRASH DATA

- 1. The analysis of traffic crash data should include, but not be limited to, the following information:
- a. Locations with the greatest number of crashes listed in order from highest to lowest.
- b. Listings of the specific roadways and the number of crashes which occurred on them.
- c. Days of the week and times when the crashes occurred.
- d. Any violations or other significant factors contributing to the crashes.

The author has concluded the for-profit aspect of this enforcement has caused many elected and other officials that have taken an oath to support and defend the Florida and United States Constitutions to overlook their oath and misrepresent the facts regarding traffic crashes caused by red light running.

The author was not paid to prepare this analysis or assisted by any other person or group other than peer review for typographical errors.

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Footnotes-

- 1. Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel: <u>Red-light cameras: Big drop in Hallandale Beach with new state law</u>, August 16, 2010. Downloaded to PDF on August 3, 2012.
- 2. <u>Department Monthly Reports</u>, City of Hallandale Beach, as of August 17, 2012. Note that "Revenue Collected from ATS" includes money to be paid to the state and others as required under Florida Statute 316.0083.
- 3. Letter to the editor by Hallandale Beach Mayor Joy Cooper: <u>Red-light cameras save lives</u>, <u>fund essential research</u> Dated July 22, 2012. Downloaded to PDF on August 3, 2012
- 4. Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel: <u>See all Broward and Palm Beach red-light camera locations</u>, July 12, 2011. Downloaded to PDF on August 3, 2012.
- 5. Miami Herald news story: <u>Hallandale Beach poised to refund red light ticket payments</u> dated November 1, 2011. Downloaded to PDF on August 3, 2012.
- 6. California v. Daugherty (California Superior Court, Appellate Division, 5/26/2011)
- 7. Florida Highway Patrol Policy Manual, "Selective Enforcement 17.20" (PDF), Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Florida Highway Patrol

About the author-

Paul Henry served as a Florida Deputy Sheriff and State Trooper for over 25 years. During his employment with the Florida Highway Patrol, he investigated numerous traffic crashes and worked as a traffic homicide investigator. He later promoted to the rank of Sergeant and supervised traffic homicide investigators and at the same time a squad of troopers. His final five years with the FHP prior to retirement were in the Bureau of Investigations at the rank of Lieutenant. Paul currently works for pro-liberty political issues in the Tallahassee area, to include driver license (REAL ID) and red light camera laws. Paul is the author of the 2012 Florida Motorist Rights Restoration Act, which would have affected how red light camera cases are handled in court.